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ARTICLE
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE TAXATION OF COMPUTER
SOFTWARE
ROBERT

W.

MCGEE·

INTRODUCTION
Computer software has tax consequences both at the state
and federal levels. At the state level, software might be subject
to sales, use or property taxation if it is considered to be tangible personal property. On the federal level, software may qualify
for the investment tax credit or research credit, also depending
on tangibility. In the last few years, both state and federal
courts and legislatures have rendered decisions and passed laws
that have altered the taxability of computer software. This article summarizes those changes and attempts to spot a trend.
STATE TAXATION OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE
For more than a decade after the first software tax case was
decided, computer software was uniformly classified as intangible for sales, use and personal property tax purposes, and therefore exempt from taxation. 1 Then, in 1983, the decisions began
• MST, DePaul University; J.D., Cleveland State University; PhD., University of
Warwick, PhD., Union Graduate School; C.P.A. (Ohio & New Jersey); Associate Profes·
sor, Seton Hall University.
1. The first case to directly address the software tangibility issue was District of
Columbia v. Universal Computer Assoc., 465 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Other early cases
also held software to be intangible for sales, use or property tax purposes. See State v.
Central Computer Serv., Inc., 349 So. 2d 1160 (Ala. 1977); County of Sacramento v. Assessment Appeals Bd. No.2, 32 Cal. App. 3d 654, lOS Cal. Rptr. 434 (1973); First Nat'l.
Bank of Springfield v. Dep't. of Revenue, 85 III. 2d 84, 421 N.E.2d 175 (1981); Grey-
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to go in the other direction, classifying software as tangible and
therefore subject to taxation. 2
In Comptroller of the Treasury v. Equitable Trust Co.,s the
issue was whether the purchase of a "canned" or off-the-shelf
program on magnetic tape constituted a transaction upon which
sales tax could be assessed. Equitable entered into several license agreements whereby it obtained the nontransferable and
nonexclusive right to use several programs in perpetuity." Legal
title, however, remained with the licensor. II
The Comptroller alleged that these transactions involved
"tangible personal property, namely, magnetic tapes which had
been enhanced in value by the copies of the programs coded
thereon," and were subject to sales tax. 6 Equitable argued that
"the predominant purpose or essence of the transaction governs
classification of the sale as involving either tangible or intangible
property. In the transfer of computer programs via magnetic
tape, the purpose is to obtain the program, an intangible, and
not the tangible tape."7 The Data Processing Management Assohound Computer Corp. v. State Dep't of Assessments & Taxation, 271 Md. 674, 320 A.2d
52 (1974); James v. TRES Computer Service, Inc., 642 S.W.2d 347 (Mo. 1982); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976); First Nat'!. Bank of Fort
Worth v. Bullock, 584 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
A number of cases involving data processing service bureaus also address the issue of
computer software tangibility. See, e.g., Miami Citizens Nat'I. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lindley, 50 Ohio St. 2d 249, 364 N.E.2d 25 (1977); Citizens Fin. Corp. v. Kosydar, 43 Ohio St.
2d 148, 331 N.E.2d 435 (1975); Accountants Computer Serv., Inc. v. Kosydar, 35 Ohio St.
2d 120, 298 N.E.2d 519 (1973); Bullock v. Statistical Tabulating Corp., 549 S.W.2d 166
(Tex. 1977).
2. For early cases holding software to be tangible, see Comptroller of the Treasury v.
Equitable Trust Co., 296 Md. 459, 464 A.2d 248 (1983); Citizens & S. Sys., Inc. v. South
Carolina Tax Comm'n, 280 S.C. 138, 311 S.E.2d 717 (1984); Chittenden Trust Co. v.
King, 143 Vt. 271, 465 A.2d 1100 (1983). Software is sometimes considered tangible for
Uniform Commercial Code purposes. See Chatios Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register
Corp., 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980); RRX Indus. Inc. v. Lab-Con Inc., 772 F.2d 543 (9th
Cir. 1985); Communications Groups, Inc. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 138 Misc. 2d
80, 527 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1988); Note, Computer Programs as Goods Under The uce, 77
MICH. L. REV. 1149 (1979).
3. 296 Md. 459, 464 A.2d 248 (1983)
4. [d. at 461, 464 A.2d at 248.
5. [d. at 400, 464 A.2d at 249.
6. [d.

7. [d. at 466, 464 A.2d at 251-52. Equitable's principal argument was that the Court
should sever the program from the tangible tape. Thus, the transaction should be viewed
from two levels, the delivery of a tangible tape and the delivery of intangible information. [d. at 468, 464 A.2d at 253. Courts that use the "essence of the transaction" test
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ciation, in its amicus brief, contended that "the transaction is a
license to use the program, and that such a license is a form of
intangible property."s
The court held that Equitable acquired "tangible personal
property, namely, magnetic tapes which had been enhanced in
value by the copies of the program coded thereon,"9 and that
"the licenses. . .do not grant intangible rights from the proprietors to Equitable... [but] simply erect contractual limitations
on the use which Equitable might otherwise make of the statutorily unprotected program copies it acquired."lo The court in Equitable thus rejected the reasoning of a long line of cases that
held taped copies to be intangible. The court saw misconceptions in the technological underpinnings of these decisions and
departures in reasoning from that usually applied in sales tax
cases. Furthermore, the court noted that a tape containing a
copy of a canned program does not lose its tangible character
because its content is a reproduction of the product of intellectual effort, just as a phonograph record does not become intangi-·
ble because it is a reproduction of artistic effort.ll The price
paid for a copy of a canned program reflects the cost of developing the program as well as any profit that the proprietor hopes
to recover. In the court's view, the fact that a canned software
program on tape is much more expensive than the typical phonograph record does not render the program tape any less tangible than a phonograph record. 12
The court did not find any legally significant distinction for
sales tax purposes between the canned computer program on
magnetic tape and music on a phonograph record:
'Both recorded music and computer programs are
sets of information in a form which, when passed
over a magnetic head, cause minute currents to
look at the substance of the transaction rather than the form it took. For example, if the
value of a program is $50,000 and the value of the tape or disk upon which the program
is stored has a separate value of $50, then the essence of the transaction is the purchase
of a program, not the purchase of a tape or disk. The fact that a tape or disk is also
acquired in the transaction is merely incidental.
8. Id. at 466, 464 A.2d at 251.
9. Id. at 460, 464 A.2d at 249.
10. Id. at 468, 464 A.2d at 252-53.
11. Id. at 484, 464 A.2d at 261.
12. Id.
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flow in such a way that desired physical work is
accomplished.' In the case of the phonograph record, the sales tax statute in Maryland has never
been viewed as conceptually severing the copy of
the performance from the tangible carrier .13
The court concluded that "the statute does not sever copies of
computer programs from the tangible carriers employed in the
subject sales."H
The day after Equitable was decided in Maryland, in what
appeared to be a one-two punch to the tax-free nature of computer software, the Vermont Supreme Court decided Chittenden
Trust Company v. King. 11I This case also held software to be taxable, but this time it was a compensating use tax that was levied
against canned software. Ie In holding that the computer tape
was tangible personal property, the court noted that "the tape
[could] be seen, weighed, measured and touched and [was] not a
right or credit."17 The court rejected Chittenden's contention
that the "focus of the transaction" was the transfer of intangible
knowledge and information, noting that the purchase of an off"the-shelf program does not involve the sale of personal services,
but rather the sale of tangible personal property. IS
The court also rejected the argument that a computer program tape was distinguishable from other taxable personal property such as films, videotapes, books, cassettes and records. In
comparison to each of the latter items, the court found that
computer software was similar since the "value lies in their respective abilities to store and later display or transmit their
contents. "19
13. [d. at 485, 464 A.2d at 261 (citation omitted).
14. [d.
15. 143 Vt. 271, 465 A.2d 1100 (1983).
16. [d. A use tax is generally imposed on the sale or lease of property that is not
subject to the sales tax.
17. [d. at 273, 465 A.2d at 1101. The Vermont statute defines tangible personal
property as "personal property which may be seen, weighed, measured. felt. touched or
in any other manner perceived by the senses and shall include fuel and electricity but
shall not include rights and credits. insurance policies. bills of exchange. stocks and
bonds and similar evidences of indebtedness or ownership." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §
9701(7) (1981).
18. Chittenden, 143 Vt. at 274, 465 A.2d at 1101-02.
19. [d. at 274, 465 A.2d at 1102.
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In conclusion, the court stated:
It may well be that the Bank could have procured, by way of telephone or personal service,
the same programming information so as to avoid
a use tax. To base the tax consequences of a
transaction on how it could have been structured
"would require rejection of the established tax
principle that a transaction is to be given its tax
effect in accord with what actually occurred and
not in accord with what might have occurred."
This we will not do. The Bank must accept the
consequences of its choice to purchase the program in the form of a tape. 20
The following year, in Citizens & Southern Systems, Inc. v.
South Carolina Tax Commission, the South Carolina Supreme
Court also held canned software to be subject to the sales and
use tax. 21 Here, the court compared the sale of magnetic tapes to
a sale of books or phonograph records, observing that the conveyance of knowledge by a professor to students in a classroom
would not be subject to tax, but publication in the form of a
book or phonograph record would be taxable 22 In assessing the
tax, the value of the books or records is based upon the value of
what is contained in them, which is intangible. 23 The value of
the paper, binding, ink or other material cost is not relevant. 2•
Appellants relied on the long line of cases that distinguished
software from books, records and movies because of the separability of the computer program from the magnetic tape and the
inherent inseparability of the matter contained in a book, on a
record, or in a movie from a book. 25 The Court was not convinced and instead agreed with the idea that:
[T]he taxability of a sale of a canned program
copy should not turn on whether the buyer stores
the program in memory. A tax system cannot be
20. [d. at 274-75, 465 A.2d at 1102 (citation omitted).

21. 280 S.C. 138. 311 S.E.2d 717 (1984).
22. [d. at 141, 311 S.E.2d at 718.
23. [d.
24. [d.
25. [d. (citing First Nat'l. Bank of Springfield v. Department of Revenue, 85 Ill. 2d
84,421 N.E.2d 175 (1981); see Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn.

1976)).
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administered dependent upon whether or not, at
the time of the transaction, the buyer's intent is
to store the program continuously in memory.26
Citizens asserted that the instructions could have been introduced into the computer through intangible means such as by
telephone or personal programming, and that the fact that
transmission was by magnetic tape should not make the transaction taxable. 27 On this point, the court indicated that Citizens
had to accept the consequences of its choice to purchase the
computer program in the form of a magnetic tape, finding that
"[t]o base the tax consequences of a transaction on how it could
have been structured would require rejection of the established
tax principle that a transaction be given its tax effect in accord
with what actually occurred and not in accord with what might
have occurred."28
Another case that held software to be tangible is Hasbro Industries, Inc. v. Norberg. 29 In that case, Hasbro purchased a
"canned" software program that could be put to immediate use
without alteration or customization. 30 Hasbro argued that the
software was not subject to the use tax because it constituted
"(1) a nontaxable service, the transfer of the disk and punch
cards bearing the written instructions being merely incidental to
those services, and (2) intangible personal property."31 The
court found that contention to be without merit. 32 Being a
"canned" program that could be used by any number of purchasers, the service element of the software was virtually nonexistent. 33 Although the software program was not perceptible to
the senses, the disk and punch cards could be seen, weighed and
measured, making the program tangible for use tax purposes. 3•
Thus, the Rhode Island court adopted the position of the Equi26. Citizens & Southern, 280 S.C. at 141, 311 S.E.2d at 718 (quoting Comptroller of
the Treasury v. Equitable Trust Co., 296 Md. 459, 464 A.2d 248, 255 (1983».
27. [d. at 141-42, 464 A.2d at 718-19.
28. [d. at 143, 464 A.2d at 719 (quoting Chittenden Trust Co. v. King, 405 A.2d
1100, 1102 (Vt. 1983)).
29. 487 A.2d 124 (R.I. 1985).
30. [d. at 126.
31. [d. at 128.
32. [d.
33. [d.
34. [d.
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table and Chittenden courts. 811 Rhode Island joined a growing
minority view that had gained much support in the previous 18
months as a result of the Vermont and Maryland decisions.

In 1986, the Tennessee Supreme Court went a step further
than other courts and taxed custom software, which, until that
time, had usually been considered exempt from sales and use tax
because it was the sale of a service rather than a product. In
Creasy Systems Consultants, Inc. v. Olsen,88 a consulting company designed or modified a client's software on a contract basis,
using the client's own disk or tape rather than its own. The consulting company argued that there was no transfer of tangible
personal property because the software was input directly into
client-owned disks or tapes, and not by means of transferring
the program from the consulting company's disk or tape. 87 Payment was on a contract basis, usually by the hour, which distinguished it from the usual software sale, which was by the package rather than time-based. 88
The Tennessee statute at issue in Creasy defined sale to include the transfer of customized or packaged computer
software. 89 The court rejected the argument that the sale could
avoid tax by inputting the information directly into clientowned disks or tapes rather than by inputting the information
into consulting company-owned materials, then transferring
them to the client. 40 The court held that the law imposed a tax
on the transfer or design of customized or packaged computer
software regardless of how the transfer was accomplished. 41 This
view differs somewhat from that of other courts, which hold that
the actual means of transfer is determinative, not the means of
transfer that could have been adopted. 42
35. See Comptroller of the Treasury v. Equitable Trust Co., 296 Md. 459, 464 A.2d
248 (1983); Chittenden Trust Co. v. King, 143 Vt. 271, 465 A.2d 1100 (1983).
36. Creasy Sys. Consultants, Inc. v. Olsen, 716 S.W.2d 35 (Tenn. 1986).
37. [d. at 36.
38. [d. at 37.
39. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-6-102(14)(8).
40. Creasy, 716 S.W.2d at 36.
41. [d.
42. See University Computing Company v. Olsen, 677 S.W.2d 445 (Tenn. 1984)
(holding that software developed for internal use was exempt from taxation, but software
developed for sale was taxable). See also TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 67-6-101 et seq., 67-6102(14)(8), 67-6-210. For an example of a case that held the actual means of transmission to be determinative, see Chittenden Trust Co. v. King, 143 Vt. 271, 275, 465 A.2d
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The West Virginia Supreme Court recently agreed with the
Citizens & Southern Systems, and Equitable decisions, both of
which reject the "essence of the transaction" test. 43
Other courts have made a distinction between canned and
custom software. In Measurex Systems, Inc. v. State Tax Assessor, the Maine Supreme Court held that canned software is
taxable but custom software is not. 44 It based its decision on the
"relative value test," which it had previously relied upon in
Community Telecasting Service v. Johnson. 411 In discussing the
differences between canned and custom software the court noted
as an important factor the value that the product has to nonbuyers.
[W]here the creation of property to be transferred
requires high skill and the materials involved are
of relatively little value and the principal value of
the finished product lies in the services to be rendered, and the product is of little value to anyone
other than the buyer, the transaction may be
deemed a sale of services rather than goods. The
relative dollar value of the service as against that
of the product, sometimes expressed in percentages, has been held significant. "Canned"
software has value apart from the programming
services that create it because of its potential for
resale and its value to more than one buyer.
"Custom" software, on the other hand, falls
within the definition of services set forth in Community Telecasting. The creation of "custom"
software requires high skill, although the materials (computer disks) are of little value. Moreover,
the product is of little value to other buyers because the software is prepared specifically for the
1100, 1102 (Vt. 1983), and infra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
43. Pennsylvania and West Virginia Supply Corp. v. Rose, 368 S.E.2d 101 (W. Va.
1988). In this case, the previous statute classified off-the-shelf computer software as tangible and subject to the use tax even though information was the real product. Id. at 10405. The rationale of the statute was that the disks upon which the information was
stored had physical form and were capable of being touched, seen and possessed-the
classic definition of tangible property. Id. at 104. See W. VA. CODE §§ 11-15A-2, 11-15A2(a), 11-15A-1(5) (1969 and 1983 Replacement Vol.).
44. Measurex Sys., Inc. v. State Tax Assessor, 490 A.2d 1192 (Me. 1985).
45. Id. at 1195-96. See also Community' Telecasting Servo V. Johnson, 220 A.2d 500
(Me. 1966).
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needs of the particular user. The principal value
lies in the services of the programmer. f8

However, the trend in case law since 1983 has not been uniformly in favor of taxing software as tangible personal property.
In Ohio, an appellate court in Compuserve v. Lindley, found
software to be intangible, and not subject to sales, use or property taxation. 47 Although the software was stored on tangible
tapes, and, as operational software, was indispensable to the operation of the computer, the true purpose of the software
purchase was to obtain intangible information, and the purchase
of the tapes was merely incidental to the purchase of intangible
information. 48 In effect, the court held that Ohio was attempting
to tax personal service transactions, which were exempt from
taxation because of their intangible nature. 49 It also specifically
disagreed with the holdings in Chittenden, Equitable, Citizens
and Southern Systems and Hasbro because these cases held
that the real purpose of the transaction was to obtain the medium upon which the software was stored (tape, etc.) rather
than the information itself. &0
Courts in Michigan and California also have recently held
software to be intangible and not subject to taxation. 1I1 In Maccabees,1I2 the Michigan Appellate Court, relying on decisions in
the District of Columbia and Tennessee, held custom software to
46. Measurex, 490 A.2d at 1195-96 (citations omitted).
47. 41 Ohio App. 3d 260, 535 N.E.2d 360 (1987); but see Ohio Farmers Insurance
Co. v. Lindley, No. 79-B-43 (Ohio Board of Tax Appeals July 15, 1981) (court found the
purchase of software to be taxable on the grounds that the tangible tapes were the true
object of the transaction); Statistical Tabulating Corp. v. Lindley, 3 Ohio St. 3d 23, 445
N.E.2d 1104 (1983) (where the true object of the transaction was a computer printout
rather than a software program, the sale was held to be the sale of tangible personal
property, and therefore subject to the sales tax).
For other Ohio cases, see Interactive Information Sys., Inc. v. Limbach, 18 Ohio St.
3d 309, 480 N.E.2d 1124 (1985); Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Lindley, 12 Ohio St. 3d
80, 465 N.E.2d 440 (1984); Aedes Associates v. Lindley, No. C-830969, (Ohio Ct. App.
1986).
48. Compuserve, 41 Ohio App. 3d at 265-66, 535 N.E.2d at 365.
49. [d. at 269-70, 535 N.E.2d at 369.
50. [d. at 265, 535 N.E.2d at 365.
51. General Business Sys. v. State Board of Equalization, 162 Cal. App. 3d 50, 56-57,
208 Cal. Rptr. 374, 378 (1984), hearing den.; Maccabees Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. State
Dep't of Treasury, 122 Mich. App. 660, 332 N.W.2d 561 (1983).
52. Maccabees Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. State Dep't. of Treasury, 122 Mich. App. 660,
332 N.W.2d 561 (1983).
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be intangible because it more closely resembled a service than a
product.1!3 The court also noted that custom programs should be
distinguished from canned programs.l!4
In General Business Systems, a California appellate court
held custom application software to be exempt from tax, since
the true object of the transaction was rendition of services. 1i1i Although the software was delivered in the form of punch cards,
delivery could have been by any number of other methods, including transmittal through the computer's keyboard, over telephone lines or via terminal. Delivery by cards was chosen because of convenience and cost.1i6
Another distinction being made in types of computer
software focuses on whether the program is application or operational software. The Kansas Supreme Court has determined that
application software is intangible and operational software is
tangible. 1i7 This distinction in treatment is based on the differing
natures of the two types of software. Operational software is
needed to make the hardware work, and so has some attributes
of hardware, which is tangible. Application software, on the
other hand, is not needed to make the hardware work.
While the majority of states still classify software as intangible and thus non-taxable, some courts, employing different
standards and tests, are finding software to be tangible. liS As a
53. District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Associates, Inc., 465 F.2d 615
(1972); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976).
54. Maccabees, 122 Mich. App. at 664, 332 N.W.2d at 564 (citing Universal Computer Assoc., 465 F.2d at 615.)
55. General Business Sys., 162 Cal. App. 3d at 56-57, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 378 (1984),
hearing den.; see CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 6006(0, 6010.9, 601O.9(a), 6016, 6051.
56. General Business Sys., 162 Cal. App. 3d at 53, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
57. In re Protest of Strayer, 239 Kan. 136, 716 P.2d 588 (1986); Appeal of AT&T
Technologies, Inc., 242 Kan. 554, 749 P.2d 1033 (1988).
58. The issue of computer software tangibility is relevant in other areas of the law
besides tax. See Hancock v. State of Texas, 402 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966). In
Hancock, an employee was accused of stealing several computer programs from his employer. [d. at 907-08. The employee maintained that he had committed petty theft rather
than grand larceny because the only tangible property he stole was the paper on which
the programs were printed and these tapes had a value of less than fifty dollars. [d. at
908. The court disagreed, holding that the programs had a value in excess of the value of
the paper upon which they were printed and that the programs, as well as the paper they
were printed on, were tangible personal property for purposes of the criminal statute. [d.
at 911.
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result a software is classified as tangible and taxable in one state
and intangible and tax exempt in another state. It does not appear that a uniform classification of software will emerge. The
inconsistent treatment of software is not limited to the states
but exists on the federal level as well.
FEDERAL TAXATION OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE
Whether computer software is classified as tangible or intangible determines whether it qualifies for federal tax credits.
The Internal Revenue Code and regulations do not specifically
state whether computer software is eligible for the investment
tax credit ("ITC").Ci9 The Code merely states that tangible personal property qualifies for the investment tax credit, without
mentioning whether computer software is tangible or intangible. 60 The only guidance is found in a few IRS pronouncements
and court cases. Although the investment tax credit was repealed by the 1986 Tax Reform Act,61 the old rules still apply to
many cases still pending before the various courts. Furthermore,
the investment tax credit rules have been repealed or changed
many times before, and are subject to possible re-enactment.
Therefore, it is useful to examine the treatment of software as it
relates to the investment tax credit.
The Internal Revenue Service developed a two-prong test to
determine whether or not an investment in computer software
qualifies for the ITC.62 If the software exists independently of
the hardware, it is treated as intangible property and therefore
ineligible for the ITC.63 But if the software costs are included in
59. I.R.C. §§ 38, 43 (1982). The investment tax credit reduces the tax liability, dollar
for dollar, for purchases of certain tangible, depreciable property. Id. at § 38. For example, if a business taxpayer purchases Section 38 property costing $100,000 and the investment tax credit percentage is 10%, then the tax liability is reduced by $10,000-10%
of $100,000. Tax credits are better than deductions because of this dollar for dollar offset. If the income tax rate is 40%, each dollar deducted reduces the tax liability by only
40 cents, whereas each dollar of tax credit reduces the tax liability by one dollar. Furthermore, depreciation deductions can also be taken, so taxpayers can both deduct the
cost of the asset over a number of years and claim an investment tax credit for the same
asset.
60.Id.
61. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 211, codified at 26 U.S.C. § 49 (1986) ("Tax Reform Act of
1986").
62. Rev. Proc. 69-21, 1969-2 C.B. 303.
63.Id.
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the price of hardware and are not separately stated, an investment credit may be taken for the entire system, not just the portion attributable to hardware. 84 In other words, if the software is
"bundled" with the hardware, it Qualifies for the investment tax
credit. Otherwise, it does not.
Federal courts have been inconsistent in their treatment of
the tangibility of computer software. In Texas Instruments, Inc.
v. United States, the Fifth Circuit held software to be tangible
for investment tax credit and depreciation purposes. 81i The court
stated that it could not accurately separate the value of the information recorded on the tapes from the value of the tapes because the value of the data was wholly dependent upon the existence of the tapes. 88 If the tapes were destroyed, nothing would
remain. An investment in the data would have no value apart
from an investment in the tapes. Thus, the software was tangible and eligible for the tax credit. 87

In Ronnen v. Commissioner,88 the Tax Court came to the
opposite conclusion, holding that software is intangible and ineligible for the investment tax credit. In Ronnen, the court applied the intrinsic value test of Texas Instruments and concluded that, based on different facts, the intrinsic value of the
software was attributable to its intangible rather than tangible
embodiments, and was therefore not eligible for the investment
tax credit. 89
A federal District Court has also distinguished Texas Instruments in holding software to be intangible, and therefore
not eligible for the investment tax credit. In Bank of Vermont v.
United States,70 the court found that the computer tape and the
information contained in the tape could be separated and exist
apart from each other. This was not the case in Texas
Instruments.
The inconsistency resulting from different state and federal
64. Rev. Rul. 71·177, 1971·1 C.B. 5.
65. 551 F.2d 599, 611 (5th Cir. 1977).
66. [d.
67. [d.

68. 90 T.C. No.7, Tax Ct. Rep. (CCH) 2639 (1988).
69. Id. at 2650.
70. 61 A.F.T.R.2d (P·H) 88·788 (1988).
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treatment of software tangibility was manifest in this case. The
Vermont Supreme Court in Chittenden,71 had held computer
software to be tangible and subject to the use tax. The District
Court in Bank of Vermont, however, rejected Chittenden as not
binding on the federal courts. This put the Bank in the unenviable position of having the same software treated as tangible for
state use tax purposes and intangible for federal investment
credit purposes.
In another context, the Tax Court has held that software is
intangible for collapsible corporation purposes. 72 A collapsible
corporation is formed to convert ordinary income into capital
gains to effectuate tax savings. 73 The Internal Revenue Code
prohibits the prearranged use of a corporation for these purposes. 74 In Computer Sciences Corp. v. Commissioner,7C1 Computax, a wholly owned subsidiary of Computer Sciences Corporation, developed a software program for the computer
preparation of income tax returns. The corporation took the position that its software program for the preparation of tax returns was intangible property and that the term "property" as
used in IRC section 341 only applied to tangible property.76 The
Tax Court held that the computer software programs were intangible property developed by the corporation and that intangible property should be considered property within the meaning
of section 341. 77
71. Chittenden Trust Co. v. King, 143 Vt. 271, 465 A.2d 1100 (1983).
72. Computer Sciences Corp. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 327 (1974).
73. A collapsible corporation is defined as
A corporation formed or availed of principally for the manufacture, construction, or production of property ... with a view
to the sale or exchange of [corporate] stock by its shareholders ... before the realization by the corporation of a substantial part of the taxable income to be derived from such property, and the realization by such shareholder of gain
attributable to such property.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 237 (5th ed. 1979).
74. See I.R.C. § 341(b)(l) (1982). If the IRS classifies the corporation as collapsible,
the gain that otherwise would be capital is taxed as ordinary gain, which means more
taxes are paid. Collapsible corporations are used to reduce the tax bite. IRS realizes this
fact, so it treats capital transactions of such corporations as if they were ordinary
transactions.
75. 63 T.C. 327.
76. [d. at 346.
77. [d. at 346-47.
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CONCLUSION

It appears that the weight of authority, while no longer
unanimous, still classifies computer software as intangible and
non-taxable. There appears, however, to be a trend among the
states to characterize computer software as tangible for state
sales, use and property tax purposes. State courts are distinguishing types of software and the means by which the software
is delivered. "Canned" software is more likely to be classified as
tangible than is custom software, although at least one court has
classified custom software as tangible. Also, if the software is delivered in the form of disk or tape, some courts may be more
likely to find that the software is tangible as compared to
software transmitted via telephone lines.
Although federal courts generally hold that software is intangible and not eligible for the investment tax credit, at least
one court held software to be tangible property that qualified for
the investment tax credit. In states that are classifying software
as tangible, there is the potential for inconsistent state and federal treatment of software.
With the rapid development in computer technology and
changing nature of computer software, however, it appears that
courts will continue to confront the issue of whether software is
tangible or intangible with differing results. Inconsistent treatment of software among the states and federal jurisdictions undoubtedly will continue.
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